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limiting a lens through which to analyse the normative effects of 
international human rights law? 
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Abstract 
The idea of compliance assumes that International Human Rights are in 
existence, protected and actively enforced in different states. Measuring compliance 
is an exercise in policing this enforcement but what this exercise will not show is the 
state of the human rights in each state. This paper explores the inadequacies of using 
compliance as a lens to consider the normative effects of international law using 
Zimbabwe as a case study. This study seeks to illustrate that there must be a wider 
outlook which creates space for scrutiny of the state of human rights prior to producing 
tables and figures which shed no light on the media censorship or the rigging of 
elections. 
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Introduction 
Compliance analysis is indeed too narrow a lens through which to consider the 
impact of international law.1 Such analysis is not formulated to illustrate the context in 
which it is functioning particularly where developing countries and former colonies are 
concerned. This is because of the colonialist history of the international system and 
the leadership of these countries. In this piece, the benefits of compliance analysis will 
be considered and then using Zimbabwe as a case study, the shortcomings of 
compliance-based analysis will be illustrated culminating in the conclusion that looking 
beyond compliance is essential as it is an exercise which does not sufficiently reflect 
the context of the environment in which it is being carried out. 
Critical Review of Compliance Analysis as a Human Rights Tool 
In this section, the discussion will open with the strengths of and need for 
compliance-based exercises as a human rights tool. This will then be followed by the 
arguments made against the use of this tool in the human rights context. What 
emerges is that there is greater criticism than praise for compliance analysis.    
The Value of Compliance Reviews as Physical Indicators 
Compliance is useful as the mark of international human rights law because 
law that is passed must be accompanied by some evidence of enforcement of the law 
by the parties responsible for doing so which can take the form of disarmament, for 
example. In this case, it is the states party to treaties signed. As the law stands, it is a 
string of words on paper and on its own does not give an indication of whether what it 
stipulates is followed. Laws may not contain enforcement or review mechanisms and 
require supplementary bodies or activities to be created to carry out this purpose.2 It 
is at this point that compliance reviews are vital. Figures or charts are produced 
providing a visual depiction of the state of agreements made in international law and 
these indicate whether or not international law is effective and making progress within 
the various regions and matters dealt with.  
 
1 Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really 
Matters’, (2010) 1 Global Policy 127 
2 Andrew T. Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90(6) California Law 
Review 1823, 1829 
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Further, there must be processes in place to hold states accountable once they 
have signed treaties and compliance analysis is an effective method through which to 
do this. Without regular investigations into and comparisons3 between the measures 
introduced by states to give effect to international law, states may become complacent 
and only partially enforce the law or not do so at all. Exercises in compliance analysis 
produce written records that can be used to detect patterns and stored to refer to in 
the future where states may challenge any admonishment they receive for poor 
enforcement history.  
The Inadequacy of Compliance Reviews  
Although the aforementioned arguments are made, it is evident that there are 
faults in the compliance review system that make it an inadequate tool through which 
to measure the normative impact of international human rights. This is primarily 
because of its reliance on figures, which do not reflect reality, and its inability to show 
the various other forces acting on or present in a state that have led to the calculation 
given as the final score.  
Compliance, in relation to the international human rights law process, is 
logically the final stage after solutions to a problem have been identified and put into 
action. It is, therefore, bizarre that this final stage should be considered the yardstick 
for the normative effects of international law. This is a somewhat shallow approach as 
it fails to consider in much depth the reasons behind compliance or the lack thereof. It 
is excessively rigid because of its mechanical effect of simply giving a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
response. The context is not taken into consideration, yet it is what dictates just how 
deeply the ideals and aims of international human rights law will penetrate the different 
states and their societies. This is not to say compliance analyses should be made 
redundant, but the main thrust of this piece is to illustrate that if the system itself is to 
be truly international, then it must be a system that considers the diversity of the states 
that it is comprised of and their political or historical backgrounds.  
 
3 Anne Janette Rosga and Margaret L Satterthwaite, “The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human 
Rights,” (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 253, 285 
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co.uk/&httpsredir
=1&article=1369&context=bjil (accessed 9 December 2018) 
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Reliance on compliance analysis is narrow and potentially misleading because 
of the need for quantifiable values to be considered in the process. Three valid points 
are raised by Anne Janette Rosga and Margaret L Satterthwaite4 on the weaknesses 
of using compliance as a measure of human rights. Firstly, ‘quantitative measures [are] 
seen to obscure “the qualitative and subjective nature of human rights’5 reducing 
human rights to figures but the problem is that human rights are extensive and have 
varying effects, many of which cannot be so quantified. The result is that in a bid to 
produce these figures, detailed explanations of what the results mean, as well as the 
context in which they exist, are excluded.6 The case study of Zimbabwe is one that will 
be explored later to illustrate the importance of context and give a practical example 
of the inefficiency of compliance-based analyses. By becoming overly technical, 
compliance minimises or forgets the ‘human’ in the human rights who holds those 
rights. Figures are cold and removed from the reality for which they are meant to be 
an indicator.  
The second difficulty is that figures are generally, and wrongly it must be said, 
assumed to be accurate and objective.7 In support of this view, Merry highlights that it 
is hastily concluded that the numbers are neutral and provide a full picture.8 This is not 
the reality. In producing these figures, all states have been massed together and often 
are being ranked on identical scales where certain factors prevalent in the state or 
acting on the state are nowhere illustrated. These may be the type of government in 
power, cultural beliefs or the state’s history. Because of this dependence on figures, 
there is already a conflict with the human rights system, which is based on subjectivity 
and intangible elements. One relevant example is the freedom of expression 
enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is impossible 
to count how much freedom of expression the citizens of a country have, yet 
 
4 Anne Janette Rosga and Margaret L Satterthwaite, “The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human 
Rights,” (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 27 
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co.uk/&httpsredir
=1&article=1369&context=bjil (accessed 9 December 2018) 
5 ibid 274 
6 Bengt Jacobsson, ‘Standardization and Expert Knowledge’ in Nils Brunsson et al. (eds) A World of 
Standards (OUP 2000) 46 
7 ibid (n 3) 283 
8 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Measuring the world: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance’ (2011) 
52 Current Anthropology S83, S89  
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compliance analysis attempts to put figures to a right better defined as an experience 
or a sentiment.9  
The third problematic area is that compliance and accompanying indicators 
allow ‘rule at a distance’10 by the institutions that are responsible for monitoring human 
rights. The bodies themselves, such as the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), which was the specific example in the article, are no longer 
in control of the exercise. The bodies leave it to the states to decide which measure of 
compliance should be used and whether the measures they have put in place are 
sufficient to match the standards set out in treaties.11 The compliance box is ticked, 
but the substantive implementation of the right may not actually match the standard.  
The monitoring bodies will not see this. Judging the level of compliance is an enormous 
task but that is not actually given to an identifiable person or group within the state.12 
Rather, the issue is avoided. This approach does little to remedy the distrust that exists 
between treaty bodies,13 created to monitor the implementation of what was agreed in 
the treaty, and the states they are monitoring. This is a product of the human rights 
system where the task of reporting is based on the states taking the initiative to send 
in reports. The states decide what information they want to include in their reports, 
when to send reports and what steps to take following the review of the reports. The 
distrust is justified as the treaty bodies are aware of this informational gap which harms 
the integrity of the reports. 
Zimbabwe: A Case Study  
The case study I have selected is of Zimbabwe, a country which has only 
recently experienced a change of presidents for the first time in 39 years following a 
military-led coup in November 2017.14 This saw the dictator, Robert Mugabe, ousted 
by Emmerson Mnangagwa.  
 
9 ibid S88 
10 ibid (n 3) 281 
11 ibid 
12 ibid 304 
13 ibid 303 
14 Timi Asuelime, ‘A Coup or Not a Coup: That is the Question in Zimbabwe’ (2018)  5(1) Journal of 
African Foreign Affairs 5-24 
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Jack Donnelly argues that ‘implementation and enforcement of universally held 
human rights thus is extremely relative, largely a function of where one has the (good 
or bad) fortune to live.’15 This is applicable to Zimbabwe whose citizens are currently 
living under near-dictatorial rule. The incumbent President Mnangagwa has claimed 
to be as ‘soft as wool’16 in complete contrast to his nickname, The Crocodile; but he is 
the same man who is held responsible for authorising the Gukurahundi massacre of 
the Ndebele tribe between 1983 and 1987 killing an estimated 20 000. No apology has 
yet been made or compensation given to the families of victims and this remains a 
point of contention between the main tribes in the country, the Ndebele and the Shona. 
The disregard for the value of human life is evident and it is, therefore, difficult to 
express the lofty and ideological principles of human rights to such a population.  
Zimbabweans knew their leader to use violence as a tool to scare, muzzle and 
maim the population. In the run-up to the 2008 elections, horrific images were 
broadcasted, mainly outside the country due to strict media censorship, of those who 
had lost limbs in the violent attacks. These were ordered by the ruling party (Zimbabwe 
African National Union-Patriotic Front/ZANU-PF) on villages where supporters of the 
opposition were thought to live. Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition party 
was a victim of beatings.17  
Elections are meant to be a show of democracy: ‘free and fair’ as was the 
tagline for the July 2018 elections. Observers from the European Union later declared 
irregularities and a lack of transparency in the electoral process but Mnangagwa sits 
as president today. The report that the observer mission subsequently published18 
made little difference as it fell on deaf ears. If the will of the people, represented by the 
ballots cast, was ignored although protected by the Universal Declaration of Human 
 
15 Jack Donelly, ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281, 
284 
16 Emmerson Mnangagwa interview with Fergal Keane (BBC News) 27 June 2018 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44619102  
17 Emilie Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement 
Problem’ (2008) Volume 62 International Organisation 689, 692 
18 European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report Republic Of Zimbabwe Harmonised 
Elections 2018 (page 47) https://cdn5-
eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/4oA6Nz1VZuz_CU9oHsm1dkLdmSSO-
jhl8H_altt88n0/mtime:1539116530/sites/eeas/files/eu_eom_zimbabwe_2018_-_final_report.pdf  
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Rights,19 there was less hope for outside institutions succeeding in registering a point 
with the state.  
The state’s own court system reveals its ideas on access to justice which is 
emphasised as a key element of international human rights.20 In Zimbabwe, only those 
who are aligned to the ‘correct’ political party are elected to high offices. The election 
of Justice Priscilla Chigumba as Zimbabwe Electoral Commission chairperson was 
highly criticised as she was said to only have been elected because of her alignment 
to ZANU-PF.21 Having a chairperson who sympathised with the party would allow 
election results to be tampered with supporting the view of the citizens that the vote 
was rigged. The court is essentially tied to the ruling party so there is an inherent lack 
of independence and the presence of bias.22 International human rights call for 
independent courts to hear matters of violations,23 but the domestic system is already 
so corrupt seeing no value in transparency. International law has positively shifted its 
focus from state to state relations to protection of the individual’s rights as indicated 
by Sohn.24 This means the state has a great responsibility as the agent of human rights 
protection but how can this work with the state that Zimbabwe is in? Ranked 113th out 
of 113 countries examined in the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2017-18 for 
its protection of fundamental rights,25 one must consider where the conversation about 
the state as protector is supposed to begin.  
In Zimbabwe, the relevant structures and legislation on the protection of human 
rights (such as a Human Rights Commission), courts at various levels and the national 
constitution are in place. The problem, however, is that these are either inaccessible, 
redundant or lacklustre efforts to uphold citizens’ rights that exist merely to placate the 
public and create the impression that human rights are valued and enforced. The 
example of the courts has been explored and features again where the Human Rights 
 
19 Article 21 (3)  
20 ibid (n 9) Article 10  
21 Joe Brock, ‘Rifts at the Top Rattle Zimbabwe After Mugabe’ (22 August 2018 Reuters Special 
Reports) < https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-zimbabwe-election-rifts-insight/rifts-at-the-top-rattle-
zimbabwe-after-mugabe-idUKKCN1L71BL>  
22 Alex Magaisa, ‘Justice Chigumba - the New ZEC Chairperson’ (BSR 31 January 2018) < 
https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2018/01/31/BSR-Justice-Chigumba---the-new-ZEC-Chairperson>  
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 14  
24 Louis B Sohn, "The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than 
States" (1982) 32 Am. UL Rev 1 
25 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2017–2018 
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Commission is concerned. Provision for the creation of the Commission was given in 
the Constitution26 and it aims to educate rural and disadvantaged communities, 
primarily, about their human rights. However, even if claims of human rights were to 
be brought to court by victims, there is little chance that the judges will make a finding 
against the state.27 In any case, the chairperson of the Commission is to be chosen 
by the president leaving little room for the independence that a National Human Rights 
Institution (NHRI) such as this needs if it is to operate at maximum efficiency. The 
president makes this appointment without the advice of the Judicial Service 
Commission.28  
It is difficult to create awareness of and a true belief in one’s entitlement to these 
rights when the government’s actions are the opposite. In a bid to hold onto power and 
intimidate the opposition, Robert Mugabe ordered Operation Murambatsvina29 (Say 
No To Dirt/Rubbish), which led to the destruction of homes and small businesses 
leaving the victims, many of whom actually turned out to be his own supporters, 
homeless, hungry and unemployed.30 Compliance will only show that Zimbabwe is a 
state party to a host of human rights treaties that it signed in 1991 but the frightening 
lack of implementation will not be recorded unless one actually draws aside the curtain 
of figures  and conducts research. Failing to carry out such research leaves 
unexplored the reasons that have informed the figures produced in the index or on a 
chart. By taking the figures at face value, the assumption made is that the states 
examined were on equal footing and the economic, political and cultural climate in one 
country was the mirror image of that in another.   
The Image on a Regional Scale 
Changing the focus from the country to the region more broadly offers less 
inspiration. The disillusionment with the concept of international human rights remains. 
 
26 Constitution of Zimbabwe Chapter 12, Part 3, Section 242 
27 Gugulethu Moyo, ‘Corrupt Judges and Land Rights in Zimbabwe’ Transparency International, 
Global Annual Report (2007)  
28 Lovemore Chiduza, ‘The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission: Prospects and Challenges for the 
Protection of Human Rights’ (2015) 15 Law Democracy & Development 156 
29 Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope 
and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in 
Zimbabwe (refer to pages 12-20 for background information on the operation) 
30 Rhode Howard-Hassmann, ‘Mugabe's Zimbabwe, 2000-2009: Massive Human Rights Violations 
and the Failure to Protect’ (2010) 32 Political Science Faculty Publications 898, 902 
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Compliance is an empty exercise where these rights are not actually protected or 
enforced leaving very little to be measured. The responsible regional bodies 
themselves have often done nothing when faced with states conducting gross human 
rights violations and leaders in the region have protected each other rather than the 
rights of the citizens.  
As well as other world leaders, Thabo Mbeki, former president of South Africa, 
protected Mugabe from UN sanctions as a response to his campaign of violence in 
2008 in keeping with his ‘quiet diplomacy’31 policy which saw him contest sanctions 
that the United States of America sought to impose on Zimbabwe. The African Union 
did not reprimand Mugabe for Operation Murambatsvina or publicise the appalling 
human rights record of Zimbabwe that had been produced by its own Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights.32 
The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights was established in 2004 and 
as a comparatively young system, its work has been plagued by numerous difficulties. 
The Commission has a duty to refer cases of violations to the court but has not done 
so consistently illustrated by the fact that the court has only decided one case since 
its establishment, and the case referred in this instance was dismissed on grounds of 
admissibility. A report by the Open Society Justice Initiative comprehensively explores 
the reasons behind the inefficiency and underutilisation of the African human rights 
system.33 Among them are factors such as a ‘lack of political will’34 of the states 
themselves, poor implementation of recommendations by states due to their non-
binding nature,35 underdeveloped follow-up systems translating to poor progress 
management,36 remedies that are overly complex or ill-suited to the victim37 and its 
comparative newness. If the regional bodies are not critical of state parties or 
emphasising the importance of upholding human rights, the international bodies are 
even further removed from the situation and will struggle to make similar 
 
31 Martin Adelmann ‘Quiet Diplomacy: The Reasons behind Mbeki's Zimbabwe Policy’ (2004) 39 No 
2 Africa Spectrum 249-76 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40175024  
32 ibid 910 
33 Open Society ‘From Judgment to Justice: Implementing International and Regional Human Rights 
Decisions’ 2010  
34 ibid 95 
35 ibid 96 
36 ibid 95 
37 ibid 100 
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recommendations heard, facing only disappointment when they return to measure 
compliance. These states are then labelled, somewhat unfairly, as areas of inactivity.  
The Problematic History of the International Human Rights System 
Some may struggle with the notion that this label is unfair, but this provides a 
segway into the discussion on the criticism of the international human rights system 
as overly Eurocentric or western and, rationally, inapplicable to all states. This will be 
the focus of this section.  
It is highly ironic that what poses as an international system, supposedly all-
encompassing, faces allegations that it lacks inclusivity. Marti Koskenniemi argues 
that the drive towards the establishment of the system of international law was ‘for a 
global modernity – the dream of the entire world one day resembling Europe’s 
idealized image of itself’.38 If the entire system is based on the ideology of only one 
region, compliance cannot reasonably be expected from any other region otherwise 
this system runs the risk of instituting a second colonisation. Anthony Woodiwiss puts 
forward a strong argument that western states have a responsibility to introspect 
because they criticise states with poor human rights records, but the issue is that the 
plans for development they insist on do not fit or endanger pre-existing structures. 
There are no steps taken to remedy the gaps that are created by insisting on these 
incompatible strategies to ensure rights are still protected.39 It is imperative that 
western states to come to the realisation that there cannot be a single model for 
international law to follow. The very essence of being an international system is to 
thrive on and strengthen the system through the diversity of its members rather than 
aim for conformity to a model that was relevant to a certain period and geographical 
location. The result is a continued emphasis on ill-fitted methods of analysis of human 
rights such as compliance reviews that neither reflect nor consider the history of or 
existing political climate in states like Zimbabwe.  
 
38 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘A History of International Law Histories’ in The Oxford Handbook of the History 
of International Law (OUP 2012) 2 
39 Anthony Woodiwiss, ‘Human Rights and the Challenge of Cosmopolitanism’ (2002) 19 Theory, 
Culture & Society 139, 140 
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Robert Williams explores the growth of the role and presence of indigenous 
peoples in the human rights forum.40 His article is interesting as it invokes contrasting 
sentiments charting the progress of the efforts of the United Nations Working Group 
on Indigenous Populations (Working Group). The Working Group had as its aim the 
drafting of a Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples. He is optimistic 
about this work stating that the process ‘provided a sanctuary for indigenous peoples 
to practice their belief that, through their stories, they can raise consciousness and 
redefine the terms of their own survival in the world.’41 On the one hand, the realisation 
that the contribution and participation of indigenous peoples and former colonies 
enriches the human rights system and assists in creating an understanding that human 
rights cannot be approached with a  ‘one size fits all’ mindset is valuable. Williams 
makes this apparent but, in doing so, raises questions concerning the need for this 
entire process to begin with.  
It is difficult to understand how human rights institutions can demand 
compliance from states where for so long, and even now in certain instances such as 
Australian Aboriginals, ‘modern international law refuses to recognize indigenous 
peoples as "peoples," entitled to rights of self-determination as specified in United 
Nations and other major international human rights legal instruments.’42  Zimbabwe, 
for example, has only been independent for thirty-nine years and the memory of the 
bitter Chimurenga (War of Independence) is still fresh.43 The leaders of many former 
colonies are likely to have fought in such wars and have remained sceptical of the 
former colonisers and their ideals as a result. Following independence, Robert 
Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party used the slogan ‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony again’ in 
the early 2000s as part of the election campaign.44 This mindset informed the manner 
in which he ruled the country. He did not seek to engage with the West and remained 
suspicious of the region condemning it for imposing crippling sanctions on the 
 
40 Robert Williams, 'Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the 
Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World' (1990) 39 Duke LJ 660 
41 ibid 676 
42 ibid 665 
43 Independence Day is celebrated on 18th April having been achieved in 1980.  
44 Chaumba, Joseph, Ian Scoones, and William Wolmer. "From Jambanja to Planning: The 
Reassertion of Technocracy in Land Reform in South-Eastern Zimbabwe?" (2003) 41 The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 10 
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country.45 It is these same leaders that international human rights organisations are 
attempting to engage with. It is not surprising that meetings may be attended, and 
treaties signed but the leaders have no real intention of implementing the terms.46 
These gestures are merely symbolic.47  
The western states presented a rather utopian and hypocritical ideal of a 
coming together of all states working towards a common goal regarding one another 
as equals, but this was not the reality then48 and neither is that the case in the present 
day. The same states, such as the British Empire and the United States of America, 
that declared the land of other populations terra nullius and made doctrines such as 
the Discovery Doctrine49, have shed this identity and now set standards for human 
rights, a large part of which is self-determination. There has been no 
acknowledgement of this history,50 but it seems peoples that were formerly oppressed 
are simply expected to accept the new status quo and conform to it. Had there been 
respect for the right to self-governance in the past, there would be no need for Working 
Groups to discuss the fact that other humans deserve the same human rights that are 
being discussed and protected by treaties. A platform like the Working Group on the 
Rights of Indigenous Populations provided former colonies a platform to express their 
views on the need for greater inclusion within the international legal community as the 
discussions at the forum led to the 1993 draft of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (eventually adopted in 2007).51 However, this would not 
cure the divide between coloniser and colony because as Karen Engle asserts, the 
Declaration did not grant indigenous populations total self-determination.52 As a close 
reading suggests, the right to self-determination was curbed. The populations’ self-
determination would only be recognised as far as its exercise lay within the prescribed 
 
45 Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulos, ‘Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism’ (2004) 31 
Review of African Political Economy 385, 387 
46 Oona A Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 
1942, 2020 
47 Eric Neumayer, ‘Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?’ 
(2005) 49 Journal of Conflict Resolution 6, 33 
48 Brett Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of International Law. European Expansion and the Classical 
Standard of Civilization’ (2005) 7(1) Journal of the History of International Law 15 
49 ibid 688 
50 ibid (n 39) 386 
51 Karen Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
the Context of Human Rights’ (2011)  22: 1 European Journal of International Law 
141,143 https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chr019 
52 ibid 150 
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boundaries of international law.53 The power imbalance would still remain with the 
former colonisers at the helm of setting these boundaries.  
Cynics would question why it seems the onus is on the indigenous groups to 
plead their cases and justify why they must be given equal recognition. The system 
seems geared against these formerly excluded states. Firstly, post-World War II, the 
drive towards the establishment of a human rights system was initiated but many 
states had not achieved ‘state’ status or were still fighting for independence so were 
excluded. To put this into perspective, one of the first African countries to achieve 
independence was Ghana in 195754 and yet the League of Nations was established 
in 1920 and the United Nations in 1945. The foundations of international law and 
human rights were already laid in the absence of a significant number of states. 
Secondly, where these states later attempted to make contributions they were met 
with inflexibility. The response in the Vienna Declaration 199355 to the Asian values 
ideology that challenged the human rights system as being based on Western values 
and incapable of being called universal is a prime example.56 There would be no 
grounds for or opportunity to challenge these rights even if based on an ideological 
conflict. Reluctance to consider the opinions of others falsifies the label of 
‘international’ human rights.  
Compliance damages the image that the human rights system has attempted 
to build because compliance scores the states indiscriminately where the system 
behind it is meant to take account of and appreciate the differences in each of the 
members.57 
One of the effects of the international human rights system is the promotion of 
discourse,58 provision of a common language in which to understand human rights 
and creation of the vision of an ideal world to work towards. This can be linked to the 
 
53 ibid 
54The Commonwealth, History of Ghana article  http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-
countries/ghana/history 
55 Chapter 1, part 5 
56 ibid (n 17) 147 
57 Robert Ward, An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe: From the 
Time of the Greeks and Romans, to the Age of Grotius (1 Garland Publishing Inc New York & London 
1795) 138 and 139 
58 Douglass Cassel, ‘Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?’ (2001) 2(1) Chicago 
Journal of International Law page 122, 126-9 
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‘standard of civilization’ function’59 of human rights debates. The discussions between 
states are effective as those that are not performing can be identified and shamed. No 
state would purposefully seek a poor human rights reputation60 as evidenced by the 
recently published report by Phillip Alston, the Special rapporteur on poverty and 
human rights, following his tour of the UK. He declared that it ‘is a political choice’61 
for a country to assist the less fortunate and ensure they maintain their dignity, and 
this has brought embarrassment to the UK but has also created space for more 
conversation around the effect of austerity measures on the lower social classes as 
recommendations to the UK government are given in the conclusion of the report.62 
The importance of discussion, which is a large part of the work of non-governmental 
organisations like Amnesty International and Freedom House, cannot be 
overshadowed by the quest for concrete results. Greater emphasis must be placed on 
the impact of discussion as a means through which to promote and deepen the impact 
of international human rights. The bodies responsible for conducting compliance 
exercises should not haste to measure what is or is not there before dialogue can be 
had to set out a clear image of the state in question taking into consideration the 
history, political climate and other elements acting on the state. 
Looking only at compliance does not assist the current international human 
rights system to change and adapt to the reality. In regions where its normative effect 
is not seen or felt, compliance merely shows that no action is being taken but one must 
think more broadly. Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel suggest that jumping ahead to 
compliance takes for granted that there are no interpretation issues and all states in 
agreement on the meanings of certain rules or words in international law.63 However, 
it is unclear to some states and their governments what punishing state ‘defectors’ is 
and when it becomes deprivation of liberty and infringement of freedom from torture, 
 
59 ibid (n 1) 130  
60 Jasper Krommendijk, ‘The Domestic Effectiveness of International Human Rights’ (2015) Rev Int 
Organ 10 489, 493 https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11558-015-9213-0.pdf 
61 Statement on Visit to the United Kingdom, by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty And Human Rights (16 November 2018) Available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23881&LangID=E  
62 Women’s Budget Group Director Mary-Ann Stephenson response to Philip Alston’s report on 
Poverty in the UK (Phillip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty: WBG responds to his 
report on UK poverty) 23 May 2019 < https://wbg.org.uk/blog/wbg-responds-to-phillip-alston-un-
special-rapporteur-on-extreme-poverty-report-on-uk-poverty/>  
 
63 ibid (n 1) 135 
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for example. Itai Dzamara, a Zimbabwean activist and journalist, was abducted in 2015 
after speaking out against Mugabe’s regime. He was labelled a defector; in fact, his 
whereabouts are still unknown three years later. It is crucial for it to be clear where 
lines are drawn with all states before compliance passes a verdict. 
Conclusion  
Discussions can often end up being one-sided because, in a bid to celebrate 
the achievements of human rights, the negative effects of international law may be 
obscured. The war on terrorism is a relevant example. The United Nations has urged 
member states to take measures to fight terror with the United States of America taking 
the lead. States are complying with the direction from an international body to protect 
citizens but what of the number of people being killed by the missile strikes in 
Afghanistan? Does this mean it is legal to deprive another human being of their right 
to life to tackle terrorism? One goal is achieved while a fundamental right is infringed 
upon, but the focus is primarily on the ‘success’ of the war on terror rather than the 
terrorism the states are then carrying out on the suspected perpetrators.  
The fact that there needs to be a discussion in any event on whether this all-
embracing system of rights protection is working is simply fodder for the sceptics’ 
writing. There may be an element of excessive optimism around the system and not 
all states find themselves in a cultural, political or historical state to engage with these 
lofty principles. An understanding of this is imperative before any discussion on 
compliance can take place. Unless this is acknowledged, and active steps are taken 
to reform the system, there will be continued resistance from certain regions who are 
not yet ready to participate, do not feel there is anything to gain or feel drowned out 
and unheard. This is not a call for a total abandonment of the system as allowing states 
to determine their own human rights standards would lead to a terrifying state of affairs. 
The current system will have to remain, but context should trump the conversation of 
compliance in determining the normative effect of international human rights law and 
how to adapt it to be truly international. Without an understanding of the spaces in 
which international human rights values are trying to be applied, reviewing compliance 
is hollow. The question of why human rights are not being upheld is left unconsidered 
or, alternatively, there is hesitation to explore this question knowing the controversial 
history behind the system.  
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